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I wish to thank Phil Dawid for organizing this session and the discussion of these 3 very
insightful and stimulating papers on causation and graphical models.
Discussion of the paper by Didelez
Vanessa Didelez (VD) addresses the difficult and important problem of adjusting for
intermediate time-dependent confounders by deriving Robins’ G-computation formula via aug-
mented influence diagrams. Her incentive for using such diagrams appears to be driven by (1)
her philosophy that causal effects are meaningless when logistic or other constraints preclude
interventions on the exposure of interest; and (2) her desire to display with greater clarity
exactly the assumptions underlying G-computation.
To identify the post-interventional law f(Y |σ = a), VD makes conditional independence
assumptions involving intervention variables σt (e.g. that Y⊥⊥σ|A,X). These variables are
usually unobserved and hypothetical and do not relate to the actual study. When studying the
effect of smoking on lung cancer, for instance, it is conceptually difficult to think of an actual
intervention node measuring whether smoking status was assigned by intervention or whether
it arose naturally, because smoking status always arises naturally in observational studies. As
such, conditions involving intervention variables (e.g. Y⊥⊥σ|A,X) have no intuitive content
and thus generally obscure, rather than clarify the assumptions underlying the G-computation
formula. Moreover, VD’s approach appears to preclude inference on the effects of smoking
(versus not smoking) because this would require one to think about interventions that force
people to smoke and these are (ethically) infeasible. Such preclusions seem overly restrictive.
While VD’s approach is very interesting and useful, I find the counterfactual outcomes
approach more attractive here because assumptions phrased in terms of counterfactuals are both
intuitive and verifiable by graphical techniques (Pearl and Robins, 1995). Here we consider for
each subject and each sequence of interventions, a, a potential outcome Ya. This represents
the outcome that would be observed for that subject if the intervention a were applied. A
typical condition underlying the G-computation formula is that Ya⊥⊥At|X t, At−1 at each time
t and for each intervention regime a. In our previous example, this expresses that for people
with the same smoking history and time-dependent covariates up to time t− 1, their decision
to smoke at time t is the same regardless of what their lung cancer status would be under a
given smoking regime. This assumption is intuitive because it is so intimately connected to
the decision process of people to smoke at each time. Such intuition helps communication with
subject-matter experts, especially when graphical models are difficult to construct.
My major incentive for advocating counterfactual outcomes approaches to address this
problem, is because they allow to directly parameterize intervention effects and, as such, to de-
velop greater robustness against model misspecification. Indeed, estimation of the mean of Ya
requires parametric models for the distribution of high-dimensional covariates Xt conditional on
past observed information. Robins (1997) argues that such models are difficult to specify and
that their misspecification may introduce serious biases. Furthermore, tests of the causal null
hypothesis will be infeasible via G-computation because there will in general be no parameter
indexing these models that will take a fixed value, say 0, under that hypothesis. These mod-
elling issues are so problematic that robust alternatives to G-computation are coercive. Such
alternatives have been proposed (e.g. structural nested models (Robins, 1997) and marginal
structural models (Robins et al., 2000)), but - to my knowledge - have all been phrased in terms
of counterfactuals. I would be very interested to see whether similar developments (based on
directly parameterizing intervention effects) are possible in the framework of causal graphs.
Discussion of the paper by Lauritzen
Seeing the connection between principal and strong surrogates has been very enlightening
to me. SL’s notion of strong surrogates seems more useful than one based on principal strata
because principal strata are unmeasurable by definition, thus creating serious conceptual and
inferential problems. Strong surrogates use the notion of unmeasured confounders instead. As
such, they allow the use of standard graphical model tools for inference and stimulate one to
think about potential measurable confounders of the association between S and R.
However, a major problem with both approaches is that the conditions for a post-
treatment variable to be a surrogate are difficult to verify, because of unmeasured confounders.
SL suggests that these conditions are in principle falsifiable from observed data using the instru-
mental inequality. While nice and intriguing, this result has limited practical value because it
will be impossible under certain data-generating mechanism to reject S as a strong surrogate,
even with an infinite amount of data. Further, even if identification is possible, I fear that
little power will be available. Finally, while the instrumental inequality also protects against
measured confounders, I expect that much more power and accuracy can be gained by adjust-
ing for those. I wonder whether the instrumental inequality can accommodate such measured
confounders and continuous variables like CD4 count, bone mineral density,...
My view is that insights about the validity of surrogate endpoints must be seriously
supported by a thorough understanding of the biological pathways of disease and treatment
action. I think this is an attainable objective, given that surrogates are often chosen as measures
of biological activity. Causal graphs offer a unique and valuable tool for incorporating such
information and thus to create more accurate and powerful tests of surrogacy.
Furthermore, there will virtually always be disease pathways causally related to the true
endpoint, yet unrelated to the surrogate endpoint. Such surrogates are no strong surrogates,
yet may be extremely valuable. In this regard, it appears more valuable to quantify the quality
of a surrogate, than to label them as strong or not. Important steps have been taken by
Freedman et al. (1992), Buyse and Molenberghs (1998) and others, but all these approaches
suffer from the general problem of adjustment for post-treatment variables that SL addresses.
SL’s paper offers valuable insights to address these problems. It would be interesting to see
these approaches and SL’s ideas combined.
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